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Summary 
Double taxation, which includes both juridical double taxation and 
economic double taxation, has been widely accepted that has an adverse 
impact on cross-border investment and leads to economic distortions and 
inefficiencies. In the EU, Member States usually conclude tax agreements 
with each other to avoid double taxation and most tax agreements are based 
on the OECD Model Tax Convention (‘OECD MTC’). However, for the 
reason that the purpose of the OECD MTC is to provide a resolution to 
juridical double taxation in some respects, bilateral agreements are usually 
unable to resolve economic double taxation. 
To protect the functioning of the single market, the European Union has 
taken some uniform measures to eliminate double taxation, including both 
substantive laws and procedural rules, for example, the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive and the Arbitration Convention. However, they all have limited 
effects and therefore fail to provide broad protection to the taxpayers. The 
Court of Justice, on the one hand, has recognized that double taxation 
impedes the fundamental freedoms granted by the TFEU. On the other hand, 
it holds itself does not have the power to rule on the juridical double 
taxation as the result of which caused by the exercising in parallel by two 
Member States of their fiscal sovereignty. By contrast, economic double 
taxation resulting from discriminatory national rules is precluded by 
fundamental freedoms if such rules cannot be justified by overriding public 
interests.  
The European Commission proposed a directive on double taxation dispute 
resolution mechanisms in October 2016 to improve the existing double 
taxation resolution mechanism. This thesis aims to identify the remaining 
double taxation issues which cannot be resolved by the current EU laws and 
to find out whether the Proposed Directive will provide a resolution to these 
issues.  
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Abbreviations 
ADRC                      Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission     
CFC                                   Controlled Foreign Company 
CJEU /The Court               The Court of Justice of the European Union 
EU                                      European Union 
GAAR                                General Anti-Abuse Rule 
MAP                                   Mutual Agreement Procedures 
OECD                                 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and         
  Development 
OECD MTC                       Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
  Capital  
PE                                       Permanent Establishment 
WHT                                  Withholding Tax 
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1.Introduction  
1.1 Introduction and background 
The globalization and the development of technology increase the cross-
border activities by corporations. Once companies conduct business in more 
than one state, there may be a risk of double taxation. Because where there 
is a cross-border activity, two or more jurisdictions have the right to impose 
taxes. It has been well-recognized that double taxation is an impediment to 
free trade and an obstacle to the development of the economy. States have 
been  worked  together  to  struggle  with  double  taxation  issues.  The 
remarkable job has been achieved is the OECD MTC , which has been used 1
as  a  model  by  many  states  when  they  are  concluding  double  taxation 
agreements with each other. 
The EU has  been working on to  build  a  stronger  and more competitive 
economy to achieve job creation, growth, and investment. To obtain these 
objectives, a fair and efficient tax system needs to be developed. It has been 
observed that “a fair tax system is not only one that ensures that profits are 
actually taxed where they are generated but also one that ensures that profits 
are not taxed twice”.  Thus, the EU has implemented many laws to resolve 2
double  taxation  between  Member  States,  such  as  the  Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive ,  the  Interest-Royalty  Directive ,  the  Arbitration  Convention . 3 4 5
However, the annual cases analysis of the Commission showed that there 
are still many cases prevented from entering existing mechanisms, which 
haven't been resolved at all.  6
To improve the existing mechanisms, on 25 October 2016, the European 
Commission proposed a Directive on Double Taxation Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms in the European Union, which aims to resolve double taxation 
on business income in all cases. The Proposed Directive is welcomed by the 
taxpayers. Because, in recent years, the policy of the EU has been focusing 
on the fight against tax evasion and tax avoidance, such as the adoption of 
 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 2014, OECD Publishing, 20151
 Proposal for a Council Directive on Double Taxation Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the 2
European Union, COM(2016) 686 final, 25.10.2016 [hereinafter “the Proposed Directive”], p.2
 Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 on the common system of taxation applicable 3
in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, [2011] OJ L 345/8 
[hereinafter “Parent-Subsidiary Directive”]
 Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest 4
and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States, [2003] OJ 
L157/49 [hereinafter “Interest-Royalty Directive”]
 Convention on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of profits of 5
associated enterprises (90/463/EEC), [1990] OJ L225/10 [Hereinafter “Arbitration Convention”]
 the Proposed Directive, p.26
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the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive . The Proposed Directive is the first time 7
in a long time that the EU has turned back to the protection of taxpayer’s 
rights. 
1.2 Aims     
The  thesis  investigates  double  taxation  issue  resolutions  in  the  EU  law 
perspective.  More  specifically,  the  thesis  aims  to  find  out  whether  the 
Proposed Directive is capable of resolving the remaining double taxation 
issues within the EU. To answer the question, the general background will 
be  provided  firstly,  including  what  is  double  taxation  and  what  are  the 
enforced EU laws to resolve it. Then the thesis goes into the questions of 
what  are  the  remaining  double  taxation  issues  and  why  the  current 
mechanisms  cannot  resolve  them.  After  identifying  the  problems  of  the 
existing  mechanism  and  the  unsolved  double  taxation  issues,  the  thesis 
analyzes the Proposed Directive and try to find out whether it overcomes the 
shortcomings  of  the  existing  mechanism and  whether  it  can  resolve  the 
remaining double taxation issues.
The  thesis  recognizes  that  there  may  be  some  potential  risks  of  double 
taxation  following  the  entering  into  force  of  the  ATAD.  To  provide  a 
comprehensive analysis of double taxation in the EU, the thesis also tries to 
identify the potential double taxation that may arise by the ATAD and find 
out whether the Proposed Directive can resolve these issues. 
1.3 Methods and materials  
This thesis employs the legal-dogmatic approach, which “concerns research 
current  positive  law as  laid-down in  written  and  unwritten  European  or 
(inter)national  rules,  principles,  concepts,  doctrines,  case  law  and  the 
literature.”  In this approach, the author begins with a review of the EU 8
current law and how it has dealt with double taxation. In this part, the EU 
directives and the judgments from the CJEU will be given high attention. In 
the next part,  the thesis delves into the double taxation issues resolution 
mechanism. The emphasis will be placed on the Arbitration Convention and 
the Proposed Directive.
 Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance 7
practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, [2016] OJ L193/1 [hereinafter 
“ATAD”]
 S. Douma, ‘Legal Research in International and EU Tax Law’ (Kluwer, 2014), p.188
!  5
1.4 Delimitation 
As the Proposed Directive only applies to the taxpayers that subject to one 
of the taxes on income from business listed in Annex I.  This thesis will not 9
come to incomes from other areas, such as pensions, labour, inheritance. 
The author acknowledges, double taxation not only occurs at international 
level  but  also  at  a  purely  national  level,  especially  economic  double 
taxation. As EU legislations only concern cross-border activities, the thesis 
not intends to cover domestic double taxation issues.
Moreover, the CJEU has ruled on double taxation issues more than what has 
been listed in this thesis. The author recognizes that it would be too much to 
cover all of them. Thus, only the issues mostly happened are analyzed.
1.5 Outlines  
The thesis is divided into five parts. Following the introduction, chapter 2 
serves to give the reader the background information of double taxation. 
After recognizing that double taxation refers to both juridical and economic 
double taxation, this chapter provides the general knowledge on these two 
kinds  of  double  taxation  and  analyzes  the  similarities  and  disparities 
between them. The European Union has applied both substantive law and 
procedural rules to eliminate double taxation. Thus, chapter 3 is devoted to 
analyzing the EU substantive legislation and how they allocate tax power 
between Member States to avoid juridical and economic double taxation. As 
the ATAD is also a substantive law in the EU, the potential problems it may 
have in respect of double taxation are given in this chapter. Chapter 4 goes 
into current procedural rules, and the emphasis of this part is placed on the 
Arbitration Convention. In this part, the thesis provides a general overview 
of the function of the Convention and tries to identify the shortcomings of it. 
Chapter 5 dives into the analysis of the Proposed Directive.
 The Proposed Directive, article (1)9
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2. Introduction to double 
taxation 
2.1 The definition of double taxation  
The notion of double taxation can be divided into juridical double taxation 
(also called “international double taxation”) and economic double taxation.
Juridical double taxation can be defined as the “imposition of comparable 
taxes in two (or more) states on the same taxpayer in respect of the same 
subject matter and for identical period”.  It mainly arises today because of 10
the  vast  majority  of  countries,  in  addition  to  levying  taxes  on  domestic 
assets and domestic economic transactions, impose taxes on capital situated 
and transactions carried out in other countries to the extent that they benefit 
resident taxpayers.  For example, based on the principle of residence, the 11
worldwide income of a taxpayer is subject to taxation in the state where he/
she is a resident. However, based on the principle of source, no state waives 
its taxation on the transactions or capital within its own territory even if they 
benefit, or belong to, non-resident taxpayers. Juridical double taxation can 
also  arise  in  a  situation of  dual  residence or  source  rules  overlap.  For 12
example, a company may be considered as a resident for tax purposes in a 
state  in  which  it  has  been  legally  registered  and,  simultaneously,  in  a 
different  state  in  which  it  develops  its  main  activity.  In  that  case,  the 
company could potentially be obliged to pay corporation tax on a worldwide 
basis in both states and consequently pay tax on the same income twice.13
Economic double taxation is used to describe the situation that arises when 
“the same economic transaction, item of income, or capital is taxed in two 
or more states during the same period, but in the different taxpayers.”  14
Economic double taxation may occur where assets are attributed to different 
persons by the domestic law of the states involved, or a legal entity is 
subject to taxation in a state which it is a resident whereas another state 
disregards the legal entity and taxes its income or capital by attributing it to 
a resident shareholder.  Economic double taxation may also arise from 15
conflicting rules regarding the inclusion or deduction of positive and 
negative elements of income and capital.  16
 Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Convention (Kluwer 2015), p.110
 ibid, p.1211
 ibid12
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 13
Economic and Social Committee Double Taxation in the Single Market, COM(2011) 712 final, p. 4
Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Convention (Kluwer 2015), p.1214
 ibid, p.1315
 ibid16
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From the international perspective, juridical double taxation and economic 
double taxation both imply that the same taxable income is taxed in more 
than one state. The disparity is that it is taxed at the same or different 
taxpayers. Juridical double taxation indicates two or more states impose 
taxes on the same taxpayer. By contrast, economic double taxation concerns 
different taxpayers subject to tax on same economic income. For example, a 
shareholder which is a resident in State A receives a dividend from a 
company which is a resident in state B. Juridical double taxation occurs 
when the shareholder is subject to WHT in the State B, and then income tax 
or corporation tax in the State A on the dividend received. In contrast, the 
economic double taxation occurs when the dividend is paid out of profits 
which have already been subject to corporation tax at the level of the 
company in the State B, and then the dividend is liable for income or 
corporation tax at the level of the shareholder. 
Juridical double taxation and economic double taxation are also different in 
respect of the taxable income. Juridical double taxation concerns same 
income of one taxpayer, for example, one dividend income that subjects to 
tax in two states. By contrast, economic double taxation involves same 
economic income, which means different incomes that might economically 
be regarded as same taxable income. For example, corporate profit at the 
level of the company and dividend income at the level of the shareholder. 
2.2 How to avoid double taxation at 
international level 
Double taxation can be unilateral  avoided if  one of the states concerned 
withdraws its tax claim. This unilateral move is often achieved whereby the 
residence state, allows a credit for the tax charged in the source state up to 
an amount equal to its own tax charge.  Other than credit, some states allow 17
an  exemption  to  avoid  double  taxation  unilaterally.  However,  unilateral 
measures are not able to avoid double taxation satisfactorily because they 
are usually neither comprehensive nor mutually consistent.  18
Therefore, states have concluded bilateral agreements with each other for 
the avoidance of  double taxation.  In most  of  the countries,  treaties  have 
same  authority  power  as  internal  law.  In  some  states,  they  are  even 
considered  to  have  priority  over  domestic  law.  Numerous  efforts  have 19
been contributing to the development of a uniform model of double taxation 
avoidance at  international  level.  The most significant work is  the OECD 
 Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Convention, p.1917
 ibid18
 ibid p.2819
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Model  Tax  Convention,  which  serves  as  a  model  for  states  to  conclude 
double taxation agreements with each other. The value of the OECD MTC 
has also been recognized by the Court of Justice. The Court consistently 
held out that “[i]t is for the Member States to take the measures necessary to 
prevent double taxation by applying, in particular, the apportionment criteria 
followed  in  international  tax  practice,  including  the  model  conventions 
drawn up by the OECD.”  However, the main purpose of the OECD MTC 20
is to provide uniform measures to settle the most common problems that 
occur  in  the  field  of  international  juridical  double  taxation.  Therefore 21
economic double taxation might not be resolved by bilateral treaties. 
 see for example Case C-524/04 Thin Cap GLO and C-414/06 Lidl Belgium 20
 OECD,  Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 2014 (full version), OECD Publishing, 21
October 30, 2015, p.I-1
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3.Double taxation in the EU 
The  European  Union  has  recognized  that  to  keep  the  single  market 
attractive, it is essential to ensure that cross-border activities are not at a 
disadvantage compared with domestic activities. Neither discrimination nor 
double-taxation resulting from the transnational character of an operation 
can be tolerated in the internal market.  Therefore, some directives have 22
been entered into force to provide a uniform measure to eliminate double 
taxation within the EU. Moreover, the CJEU has given preliminary rulings 
concerned double taxation in some circumstances. 
In  this  part,  the  thesis  will  delve  into  the  EU  substantive  legislation 
concerning double taxation. To do so, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and 
the Interest-Royalty Directive will be reviewed firstly. Then some relatively 
common double taxation problems and the judgments from the CJEU will 
be analyzed. Finally, the thesis will discuss whether there would a risk of 
double taxation resulting from the adoption of the new Directive — ATAD. 
3.1 Interest-Royalty Directive 
Interest payment means that a certain amount of interest that the borrower 
pays to the lender on loan.  The meaning of  the term ‘interest’ has been 
described consistently in the OECD MTC and Interest-Royalty Directive. It 
means “income from debt-claims of every kind, whether or not secured by 
mortgage and whether or not carrying a right to participate in the debtor's 
profits, and in particular, income from securities and income from bonds or 
debentures,  including  premiums  and  prizes  attaching  to  such  securities, 
bonds or debentures; penalty charges for late payment shall not be regarded 
as interest.”23
Juridical  double  taxation  frequently  occurs  when  both  states  concerned 
impose  taxes  on  the  interest  payment  at  the  hands  of  the  creditors.  By 
contrast,  economic  double  taxation  arises  when  the  state  of  the  creditor 
imposes a tax on the interest payment while the state of the debtor does not 
allow  a  deduction  from  the  profits  of  the  debtor  which  have  already 
subjected to corporation taxation.
The aim of the Directive is to protect the single market by ensuring that 
transactions between companies of different Member States should not be 
subject  to less favorable tax treatment than those applicable to the same 
 Commission Staff  Working Paper Company Taxation in the Internal Market, COM (2001) 582 22
final, p.284
 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 2014, OECD Publishing, 2015, article 11 23
and Interest-Royalty Directive, article 2
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transaction carried out between companies of the same Member State.  For 24
this purpose, interest shall only subject to tax once in a Member State. 
Pursuant  to  the  Article  1  of  the  Interest-Royalty  Directive,  “Interest  or 
royalty payments arising in a Member State shall be exempt from any taxes 
imposed on those payments in that State, whether by deduction at source or 
by assessment, provided that the beneficial owner of the interest or royalties 
is  a  company  of  another  Member  State  or  a  permanent  establishment 
situated  in  another  Member  State  of  a  company  of  a  Member  State.”  25
However,  this  Directive  has  limited  applicable  scope.  It  only  applies  to 
associated companies (a minimum 25% shareholding requirement) which 
are resident inside the EU and only to the direct beneficial owner of the 
interest.  The  benefit  of  this  Directive  may  be  withdrawn  in  cases  of 
fraudulent or abusive transactions.26
Moreover,  the  purpose  of  this  Directive  is  to  resolve  juridical  double 
taxation  concerning  cross-border  interest  payment.  As  the  CJEU  held 
that,“it aims to prohibit the taxation of interest in the source Member State 
to  the  detriment  of  the  actual  beneficial  owner.  That  provision  concerns 
solely the tax position of the interest creditor.”  In that sense, the Interest-27
Royalty Directive does not eliminate economic double taxation.
3.2 Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
The EU has adopted the Parent-Subsidiary Directive to provide a uniform 
way of preventing double taxation on dividend payment within the EU. The 
objective of it is to exempt the withholding tax charged on dividends and 
other  profit  distributions  paid  by  subsidiary  companies  to  their  parent 
companies and to eliminate double taxation of such income at the level of 
the  parent  company.  The  Directive  provides  measures  to  abolish  both 28
juridical double taxation and economic double taxation concerning dividend 
payment.  As regards juridical  double taxation,  profits which a subsidiary 
distributes to its parent company shall be exempt from WHT.  As regards 29
economic double taxation, the Directive provides that the parent company 
either,  “refrain  from taxing  such  profits”  or  “tax  such  profits  but  while 
authorizing the parent company to deduct from the amount of tax due that 
fraction  of  the  corporation  tax  related  to  those  profits  and  paid  by  the 
subsidiary.”30
 Interest-Royalty Directive, recital 124
 ibid, article 1(1)25
 ibid, article 526
 C-397/09 Scheuten ECLI:EU:C:2011:292, para. 2827
 Parent-Subsidiary Directive , recital 328
 ibid, article 129
 ibid, article 530
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This Directive provides that, to apply this directive, the parent company in a 
Member State shall  have a minimum holding of 10% in the capital  of a 
subsidiary  in  another  Member  State.  As  the  Parent-Subsidiary  Directive 
applies  only  to  associated  companies,  it  does  not  cover  non-associated 
companies  or  individual  shareholders.  Moreover,  this  Directive  shall  not 
preclude the application of domestic or agreement-based provisions required 
for the prevention of fraud or abuse.
Overall, in respect of the payment of interests, royalties and dividends, the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest-Royalty Directive can eliminate 
double taxation to some extent.  But there are still  many cases cannot be 
resolved due to the limited scope of these two Directives. 
3.3 Case-law from the Court of Justice of 
the European Union 
3.3.1 Juridical double taxation 
In the Kerckhaert-Morres , Mr and Mrs Kerckhaert-Morres were residents 31
in  Belgium  and  subjected  to  worldwide  taxation  there.  They  received 
dividend income from France  and  such  income was  subject  to  WHT in 
France. Belgian tax authority rejected to grant a tax credit for the WHT they 
had paid.  Mr and Mrs Kerckhaert-Morres  argued the denying of  the tax 
credit  subjected  them  to  a  heavier  tax  burden  than  internal  dividend 
payment. The Court of Justice rejected their argument and held that there 
was no different treatment between domestic dividend and inbound dividend 
as both of them were subject to income tax at an identical rate of 25%. As 
regards, the denying of tax credit, the Court stated that it was not precluded 
by the fundamental freedoms in the TFEU as “the adverse consequences …
resulting from the exercise in parallel by two Member States of their fiscal 
sovereignty”  and “ Community law, in its current [situation], does not lay 32
down any general criteria for the attribution of areas of competence between 
the Member States in relation to the elimination of double taxation within 
the  Community.  Consequently,  it  is  for  the  Member  States  to  take  the 
measures necessary to prevent situations such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings.”  33
The Court continuously remains its position in the Kerckhaert-Morres in its 
following cases, for example, Damseaux  and Levy& Sebbag . Therefore 34 35
 C-513/04 Kerckhaert-Morres,  ECLI:EU:C:2006:71331
 ibid, para. 2032
 ibid, para. 22, 2333
 C-128/08 Damseaux, ECLI:EU:C:2009:471, para. 2734
 Katharine Daxkobler and Eline Huisman, ‘Levy& Sebbag: The ECJ Has Once Again Been Asked 35
To Deliver Its Opinion On Juridical Double Taxation in the Internal Market’, European Taxation, 
August 2013
!  12
the Court regards itself as unable to offer remedies against juridical double 
taxation. 
3.3.2 Economic double taxation 
In  comparison to  the  juridical  double  taxation,  the  Court  holds  different 
position concerning economic double taxation. Pursuant to the case-law, it 
can  be  concluded  that  national  rules  of  Member  States  that  give  more 
favorable  treatment  to  domestic  situations  as  opposed  to  cross-border 
situations in the area of  economic double taxation,  are precluded by the 
fundamental  freedoms,  in  the  absence of  pertinent  justifications.  In  the 36
following, the CJEU’s rulings on some common economic double taxation 
issues will be reviewed. 
3.3.2.1 Thin capitalization rules 
For  tax purposes,  the  instruments  that  taxpayers  employ to  finance their 
businesses can either qualify as equity or debt. The distribution of the profits 
generated from equity instruments (for example, dividend) is generally not 
deductible at the level of the distributing entity, but may (partial) relief from 
economic double taxation by either credit or exemption method at the level 
of the shareholder.  In contrast, profits on debt instruments (for example, 37
interest)  is,  in  general,  deductible  at  the  level  of  the debtor  while  being 
taxable at the level of the creditor.  For intra-group companies, they have 38
incentives to choose to finance their business through debt other than equity 
instruments in the reason that the debtor is able to reduce its taxable base, 
especially  if  the  debtor  locates  in  a  high-tax jurisdiction.  Such tendency 
leads to the reduction of the tax revenue in the debtor states. In order to 
protect  their  tax  revenue,  many  countries  have  adopted  so-called  thin 
capitalization rules, which deny the tax treatment of debt instrument when a 
certain limit is exceeded.  The thin cap rules may lead economic double 39
taxation  if  a  Member  State  unilateral  denies  the  deduction  of  interest 
expense.  In the following,  some of  the case-law from the CJEU will  be 
analyzed in order to find out to what extent the thin cap rules are contrary to 
the fundamental freedoms. 
Case C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst40
Legal background and facts
The German thin cap rules that applied from 1996 to 1998 provided that 
repayment in respect of loan capital,  which a resident company received 
 Communication (n.13), p.536
 T.J.C. van Dongen Thin Capitalization legislation and the EU Corporate Tax Directive, p.137
 ibid38
 ibid39
 C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst ECLI:EU:C:2002:749 [hereinafter “Lankhorst-Hohorst”]40
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from a shareholder not entitled to the imputation tax credit,  which had a 
substantial  holding  of  its  shares  at  any  point  in  the  financial  year,  was 
regarded as a hidden profit distribution, where (i) a consideration calculated 
as a fraction of the capital was agreed and (ii) the loan capital was more than 
three times the proportional equity capital of the shareholder at any point in 
the  financial  year.  Unless  the  loan  can  be  obtained  from  independent 41
parties.
A shareholder not entitled to the imputation tax credit included both non-
resident  shareholders  and  German  resident  shareholders  exempt  from 
corporate income tax. German resident shareholders exempt from corporate 
income  tax  include  the  legal  entities  governed  by  public  law  and 
corporations carrying out business on specific fields or performing tasks that 
should be encouraged.42
Lankhorst-Hohorst (German subsidiary), was 100% owned by Lankhorst-
Hohorst BV (LH BV, Dutch parent company), the sole shareholder of which 
was Lankhorst Taselaar BV (LT BV Dutch Grandparent company).  LT BV 
granted  an  interest-bearing  loan  to  Lankhorst-Hohorst  in  order  for 
Lankhorst-Hohorst to reduce its bank borrowing and thus to reduce the bank 
interest charge. And in these years, Lankhorst-Hohorst suffered losses. The 
interest payment was captured as covert profit distribution in according with 
the German thin cap rules. Lankhorst-Hohorst challenged the decision of 
German  tax  authority  in  the  reasons  that  the  loan  constituted  a  rescue 
attempt,  and the German thin cap rules  were discriminatory because the 
shareholders not entitled to the tax credit were mostly foreign companies. 
The German court requested a preliminary ruling on the compatibility of 
German thin cap rules from the ECJ.
Restriction and justifications
The Court held that although the deductibility of interest paid was based on 
the entitlement to a tax credit, not the seat of the parent company, the effect 
of the rules actually same.  The German parent companies not entitled to a 43
tax credit were those being governed by public law or carry out activities of 
common interest. Those entities were not comparable to the parent company 
of Lankhorst-Hohorst which was a profit-oriented company. The actual fact 
of the rules was that interest paid to a resident company was deductible, but 
to a non-resident company was not deductible and was treated as covert 
profit  distribution.  Such  different  treatment  makes  it  less  attractive  for 
companies to established in other Member States. Thus it is prohibited by 
the freedom of establishment in the TFEU. 
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The  restriction  is  permissible  if  it  can  be  justified  by  overriding  public 
reasons and the national rule must be appropriate for ensuring attainment of 
the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
that objective.
The German government put forward, first, the risk of tax evasion. It was 
argued that the rules were designed to counter tax evasion by preventing the 
profits  from  shifting  from  where  they  were  generated  to  low-taxation 
jurisdiction. And there was an exception if the company concerned could 
prove that the loan can be obtained from independent parties.  The Court 
rejected the holdings in the reasons that the legislation at issue did not have 
the specific purpose of preventing wholly artificial arrangements, designed 
to circumvent national tax legislation concerned, but applied generally to 
any situation in which the parent company has its seat, for whatever reason, 
outside Germany.  Moreover, no abuse had been found in the present case, 44
Lankhorst-Hohorst  suffered a loss in 1996, 1997 and 1998, the loan had 
been  granted  by  its  parent  company  was  to  assist  Lankhorst-Hohorst  to 
reduce the interest burden resulting from its bank loan.45
Second, it was argued that the restriction could be justified by the need to 
ensure the coherence of the applicable tax systems as the provisions were in 
accordance with arm’s length principle. Because in Bachmann  the Court 46
held that the need to ensure the coherence of the tax system could justify 
national rule which restricted the free movement of person. However, this 
justification was rejected by the Court. In Bachmann there was “a direct link 
between  deductibility  of  pension  and  life  assurance  contributions  and 
taxation  of  the  sums  received  under  those  insurance  contracts  and 
preservation of that link was necessary to safeguard the coherence of the 
relevant tax system”.  There was no such direct link in this case because 47
the German government did not provide any tax advantage to offset the less 
favorable  treatment  suffered  by  the  subsidiaries  of  non-resident 
companies.  48
Third,  to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of  fiscal  supervision.  However,  the 
German government failed to submit any argument on how the provision 
enabled  the  German  tax  authorities  to  supervise  the  amount  of  taxable 
income.49
Remark: it is clear from this case that thin cap rules resulting in economic 
double taxation constitute a restriction on fundamental freedoms if the rules, 
by object or effect, treat the internal and cross-border situations differently. 
 Lankhorst-Hohorst, para. 3744
 ibid, para. 3845
 C-300/90 Bachmann ECLI:EU:C:1991:34046
 Lankhorst-Hohorst, para. 4247
 Lankhorst-Hohorst, para. 4248
 Lankhorst-Hohorst, para. 4849
!  15
And it  cannot be justified by the prevention of tax avoidance if it  is not 
specified at preventing wholly artificial arrangement. 
C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation50
Following  the  Lankhorst-Hohorst,  the  UK  national  court  requested  a 
preliminary ruling on the compatibility of the UK thin capitalization rules 
from the  Court  of  Justice.  Following  UK’s  rules,  generally,  the  interest 
payments from a resident subsidiary to an associated company outside the 
UK may be recharacterized as profit distributions. 
The UK government argued that the fundamental provision shall not apply 
because the UK rule was the exercise of Member States’s fiscal competence 
as  allocated  in  accordance  with  international-recognized  principle  (arm’s 
length principle in OECD MTC) in the tax treaties.  Under this principle, 51
where the transaction is entered into arm’s length terms, it is the State in 
which  the  lending  company  is  resident  has  the  right  to  tax  the  interest 
received,  whereas  where  the  transaction is  not  in  line  with  arm’s  length 
terms,  the  right  to  do  so  belongs  to  the  State  in  which  the  borrowing 
company situates.  Also most  of  the  double  tax agreements  including a 52
provision permitting the corresponding competent authority to agree on a 
compensating adjustment,  therefore any increase in taxable profits in the 
State of the borrowing company can be offset by a corresponding reduction 
in taxable profits in the State in which the lending company is established.  53
The Court rejected the argument by stating the national provisions at issue 
in  the main proceedings were not  concerned only with  the allocation of 
powers  between the UK and its  contracting partner.  Because rather  than 
seeking to avoid double taxation, the national rule reflected the choice made 
by that  Member State  to  organize its  tax system to prevent  profits  from 
being untaxed in that State through a system of thin capitalization.  As the 54
opinion from the Advocate General, the unilateral nature of the provisions 
treating certain interest paid to non-resident companies as a distribution is 
negated  neither  by  the  fact  that  Member  State  did  so  on  the  basis  of 
internationally-recognised  principles  nor  that  it  sought  to  ensure 
compensation adjustments for the avoidance of double taxation under its tax 
treaties.  Moreover,  even  if  the  provision  is  implementing  criteria  laid 55
down in DTCs, Member States are obliged to comply with the Community 
law when they are exercising the powers of taxation allocated under them.56
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As  regards  whether  the  restriction  can  be  justified,  the  Court  accepted 
justification of the prevention of tax avoidance, as the UK rules specifically 
targeted  wholly  artificial  arrangements  designed  to  circumvent  the 
legislation  of  the  Member  State  concerned.  And  the  Court  made  a 
clarification concerning the requirements of national rules not going beyond 
what  is  necessary  by  obliging  the  legislation  that  shall  provide  for  “a 
consideration of objective and verifiable elements which make it possible to 
identify the existence of a purely artificial arrangement, entered into for tax 
reasons  alone,  to  be  established  and  allows  taxpayers  to  produce,  if 
appropriate and without being subject to undue administrative constraints, 
evidence as to the commercial justification for the transaction in question”.  57
And  “where  it  is  established  that  such  an  arrangement  exists,  such 
legislation treats that interest as a distribution only in so far as it exceeds 
what would have been agreed upon at arm’s length”.58
Remark: the Court held the limitation on the deduction of interest paid is a 
unilateral measure other than the allocation of power between contracting 
States,  and  even  if  the  national  rules  in  accordance  with  the  OECD 
principle, it nonetheless has to be compatible with EU Treaties. Also, in this 
case, it is clear that the thin cap rules can be justified by the prevention of 
tax avoidance if it meets the proportional test mentioned above. 
C-593/14 Masco Denmark and Damixa59
As we can see above,  the limitation on deduction of  the thin cap rules, 
normally by object or effect, impose different treatment on the internal and 
cross-border situation, which is precluded unless can be justified by the need 
to  prevent  tax  evasion.  The  rights  of  limitation  on  deduction  of  interest 
belong to the State in which the borrowing company is a resident. However, 
the  thin  cap  rules  on  the  State  of  the  lending  company  may  also  be 
incompatible with EU Treaty.
Legislation and facts
Under  Danish  law,  Danish  companies  are  liable  to  pay  tax  on  interest 
income in Denmark and are generally  entitled to  a  deduction of  interest 
expenditure.  However,  a  company’s  right  to  deduct  interest  expenses  is 
limited in the event of thin capitalisation, where the ratio of the company’s 
debt in relation to its equity at the end of the tax year exceeds 4:1, interest 
expenses and losses relating to the excess part of the controlled debt cannot 
be  deducted  unless  the  company demonstrates  the  debt  can  be  obtained 
between independent companies.  In order to prevent double taxation, the 60
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interest income is tax exempt for its recipient. However, this provision only 
applies when the debtor company is also resident in Denmark.  
Damixa (Danish Parent) is a Danish parent company holding all the shares 
in subsidiary Damixa Armaturen resident in Germany (German Subsidiary). 
Danish Parent had granted a loan to German Subsidiary in respect of which 
it  received  interest.  German  Subsidiary  was  not  entitled  to  deduct  the 
interest paid to Danish Parent due to German thin capitalization rules. The 
Danish tax authorities took the view that the interest received from German 
Subsidiary was taxable income for Danish Parent, although it would have 
been tax exempt if received from a subsidiary resident in Denmark. Danish 
Parent appealed the decision arguing that disallowing the exemption was 
against  the  freedom of  establishment  as  the  exemption  was  denied  only 
because  the  interest  was  received  from a  subsidiary  resident  in  another 
Member State.  The Danish courts  requested a  preliminary ruling on this 
issue from the ECJ.
Restriction and justifications
The Court held that providing a tax exemption to a resident company in 
respect of the interest income it received from a resident subsidiary in so far 
as that subsidiary is not entitled to a tax deduction for interest payment due 
to the national thin cap rules constitutes a tax advantage.  Denying such an 61
advantage for  a  resident  company in relation to interest  received from a 
subsidiary resident in another Member State is liable to render less attractive 
the  exercise  by that  parent  company of  its  freedom of  establishment  by 
deterring it from setting up subsidiaries in other Member States.62
Such a different treatment is permissible only if it relates to situations which 
are  not  objectively comparable  or  if  it  can be justified by an overriding 
reason  in  the  public  interest.  The  Court  held  that  they  are  objectively 63
comparable because, in both of the cases, the interest income received by 
the parent company is liable to be subject to economic double taxation or to 
a series of charges, which is what the legislation at issue seeks to avoid.  64
The  Danish  government  submitted  that  the  difference  in  treatment  is 
justified both by the need to ensure a balanced allocation of  tax powers 
between the Member States and by the need to prevent tax avoidance.
The Court accepted the first justification because if the tax exemption shall 
be allowed in relation to the interest paid by a non-resident subsidiary where 
the subsidiary is not entitled to deduct the interest expenses due to thin cap 
rules of that other Member State, the tax rights on the interest income of the 
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Member State of the parent company would depend on the thin cap rules of 
other  Member  States.  The  legislation  in  question  ensures  the  balanced 
allocation  of  taxing  powers  between  Member  States  by  limiting  the  tax 
exemption solely to interest paid by a resident subsidiary.  65
However, the national legislation in question goes beyond what is necessary 
to achieve the objective of the national law. Although a Member State is not 
required to draw up its tax rules on the basis of those in another Member 
State in order to remove disparities arising from national tax rules,  it must 66
treat cross-border situations the same way as internal situation where it has a 
system to prevent or mitigate a series of charges to tax or economic double 
taxation.  Hence,  a  less  restrictive  measure  in  line  with  the  balanced 67
allocation of  taxing powers would be to provide a  tax exemption to the 
parent  company  for  interest  paid  by  the  subsidiary  resident  in  another 
Member  State  up  to  the  amount  that  the  subsidiary  was  not  entitled  to 
deduct under the thin capitalization rules of that another Member State.68
The ECJ rejected the justification of the need to prevent tax evasion in the 
reason that the legislation at issue does not specifically aim at preventing 
wholly artificial arrangements but generally excludes all resident companies 
that have granted, irrespective of the reason, a loan to a thinly capitalized 
subsidiary resident in another Member State. In the case at issue, it was also 
clear  that  the  loan  Danish  Parent  granted  to  German  Subsidiary  was  to 
finance the latter which was in major financial difficulties. Therefore, the 
loan arrangement did not constitute a wholly artificial arrangement entered 
into only for tax reasons.
Remark:  in  this  case,  where  a  Member  State  employs  a  system  for 
preventing  or  mitigating  a  series  of  charges  to  tax  or  economic  double 
taxation, the system must treat the internal and cross-border companies in 
the same way. The different treatment may be justified by the need to ensure 
a balanced power to tax provided that the national rules exempt the amount 
that the subsidiary was not entitled to deduct under the thin capitalization 
rules of the residence state of the subsidiary.
Conclusion
From the CJEU’s case-law, it can be concluded although national thin cap 
rules  may  be  in  accordance  with  international  principle  or  guideline, 
especially the OECD and arm’s length principle, it constitutes a restriction 
on fundamental freedoms if the rule, by object or effect, treats the internal 
and cross-border situations differently. Moreover, when a Member State sets 
up a system for preventing economic double taxation, the system shall apply 
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to  the  internal  and  the  cross-border  transaction  in  the  same  way.  The 
restriction may be justified by the need to ensure a balanced power to tax 
between Member States and the need to combat tax evasion. Nonetheless, in 
order to be justified, the national legislation shall not go beyond what is 
necessary, which implies that the national rules shall provide a consideration 
of objective and verifiable elements which make it possible to identify the 
existence  of  a  purely  artificial  arrangement,  and  provide  the  taxpayer 
opportunities to prove that the transaction is genuine. Moreover, where it is 
established that such an arrangement exists, the legislation concerned shall 
treat the interest payment as a distribution only in so far as it exceeds what 
would have been agreed upon at arm’s length.
3.3.2.2 Transfer pricing 
Economic  double  taxation  in  transfer  pricing  occurs  when  the  tax 
administration of a Member State unilateral  makes an adjustment on the 
price  put  on  the  cross-border  transaction  between  associated  companies, 
without this adjustment being offset by a corresponding adjustment in the 
other Member State.  In the result, the adjustment may subject to tax at the 69
hand of  a  company in the first  Member State as  well  at  the hand of  an 
associated  company  in  the  latter  Member  State.  The  transfer  pricing 
adjustment may breach the freedoms of movement granted by the Treaties.  
C-311/08 SGI70
Legislation and facts
Under the Belgian law applicable at the material time, where an undertaking 
established  in  Belgium  granted  unusual  or  gratuitous  advantages,  those 
advantages  shall  be  added  to  its  own  profits,  unless  they  were  used  to 
determine the taxable income of the resident recipients.  By contrast, where 71
the recipient company was a non-resident, such advantages were included in 
the tax base of the Belgian company which granted those advantages and 
taxed accordingly.  
SGI  which  is  a  resident  in  Belgium  has  a  65%  holding  in  a 
company(‘Recydem') which is a resident in France. The interest-free loan 
granted by SGI to Recydem has been recognized as unusual or gratuitous 
advantages  by  Belgian  tax  authorities.  Under  the  Belgian  rules,  a  sum 
corresponds  to  notional  interest  calculated  at  an  annual  rate  of  5% was 
added to the profits of SGI. 
Restriction and justifications
 Commission Staff  Working Paper Company Taxation in the Internal Market, COM (2001) 582 69
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The Court  held  that  the  different  tax  treatment  of  unusual  or  gratuitous 
advantages, based on whether the recipient company was a resident or a 
non-resident,  constituted  a  restriction  on  the  freedom  of  establishment. 
Because the upward adjustment of the profits of the company granting these 
advantages  could  lead  to  economic  double  taxation  of  the  advantages 
concerned, as these advantages could be taxed both at the level of the non-
resident recipient company and the Belgian company.
The Belgian Government argued first the disadvantage from the economic 
double taxation was not attributable to Belgium, but to the other Member 
State,  which  rejected  to  make  a  corresponding  downward  adjustment. 
Second, that risk was greatly diminished by the fact that it was possible to 
apply the Arbitration Convention to eliminate double taxation. Accordingly, 
the difference in treatment based on the place where recipient companies 
have their registered office was less significant than it might appear.72
The Court rejected the observations of the Belgian government. The Court 
emphasizes that the company which grants unusual or gratuitous advantages 
and the company which receives these advantages are separate legal persons 
and they have their own individual tax liability. Thus, the tax burden borne 
by the recipient company in a domestic situation cannot be likened to the 
taxation,  in  a  cross-border  situation,  of  the  company  granting  the 
advantage.  Concerning the  risk  of  double  taxation could potentially  be 73
mitigated  through  the  Arbitration  Convention,  the  Court  rejected  this 
argument for the reason that the relevant procedures are lengthy and the 
taxpayer must bear the burden of double taxation during the course of such 
procedures.  In  addition,  certain  situations  covered  by  the  relevant 74
legislation fall outside the scope of the Arbitration Convention.
The Belgium government put forward the justification on the ground of the 
need to ensure a balanced allocation of the power to tax between Member 
States and the prevention of tax avoidance.
As regards the need to ensure a balanced allocation of the power to tax 
between Member States. The Court held that such a justification might be 
accepted  where  the  system  in  question  is  designed  to  prevent  conduct 
capable of jeopardizing a Member State to exercise its tax rights in relation 
to  activities  carried  out  in  its  territory.  In  this  case,  to  permit  resident 75
companies  to  transfer  their  profit  in  the  form  of  unusual  or  gratuitous 
advantages  may  undermine  the  balanced  allocation  of  the  power  to  tax 
between Member States. By enabling Belgium to include these advantages 
in the tax base of the resident company granting the advantages, and to tax 
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them accordingly, the relevant legislation permitted Belgium to exercise its 
taxing jurisdiction in respect of activities carried out in its territory.
As regards the prevention of tax avoidance, national legislation which is not 
specifically  aiming  at  preventing  wholly  artificial  arrangements  may 
nevertheless  be  regarded  as  justified  by  the  objective  of  preventing  tax 
avoidance, taken together with that of preserving the balanced allocation of 
the power to impose taxes between Member States.76
And it pointed out that permitting resident companies to grant unusual or 
gratuitous  advantages  to  related  companies  which  are  resident  in  other 
Member States, without applying any corrective tax measure, would bear 
the risk that by means of artificial arrangements income would be shifted to 
companies  established in  Member  States  applying the lowest  tax rate  or 
established in Member States which do not tax such income.
The legislation concerned was also held to be proportionate to the objectives 
pursued, as the taxpayer had the opportunity, without undue administrative 
constraints,  to  provide  evidence  of  commercial  justifications  and  could 
challenge the tax authorities’ assessment before national courts. In addition, 
only the “non-arm’s length” part of the advantages concerned was included 
in the tax base of the resident company that granted them.
Remark:  The  legislation  in  the  proceeding  provides  that,  in  the  internal 
circumstance, the unusual or gratuitous benefit will be added to the profit of 
the  benefit  granting  company  only  if  the  benefit  is  not  included  in  the 
taxable  profit  of  the  recipient  company.  In  contrast,  in  the  cross-border 
situation, the benefit will be added to the profit of the former company no 
matter whether the benefit will  be taxed at  the level of foreign recipient 
company or not. Such a different treatment resulting from transfer pricing 
rules leads to economic double taxation, which constitutes a restriction on 
the  freedoms  of  movement.  The  restriction  may  be  justified  by  taking 
together the need to ensure the balanced allocation of tax power between 
Member States and the prevention of tax avoidance, because, such rules are 
capable to prevent the profits shift by artificial arrangement and recapture 
the tax which shall normally paid in a Member State. 
C-318/10 SIAT77
Legal background and facts
According  to  Belgian  law,  the  ‘general  rule’  provided  that  companies 
expenditure  shall  be  regarded  as  deductible  business  expenses  if  it  is 
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necessary for acquiring or retaining taxable income and if the taxpayer can 
demonstrate the authenticity and amount of that expenditure.78
At the same time, according to a ‘special rule’, payments for supplies or 
services  made  by  Belgian  taxpayers  to  taxpayers  established  in  other 
Member States shall not be regarded as deductible business expenses, where 
the latter are not subject to tax on income or are subject to a tax regime 
which  is  appreciably  more  advantageous  tax  regime  than  the  applicable 
regime in Belgium.  The denial of deduction can be refuted by the taxpayer 79
only if  he can prove that  such payments  relate  to  a  genuine and proper 
transaction and do not exceed the reasonable limits.80
Restriction and justification
The Court firstly stated that the substantive criteria applied under general 
rule and the special rule were not same as regards the deduction of business 
expenses. Under the general rule, there was a presumption that the cost was 
necessary for acquiring or retaining taxable income. By contrast, under the 
special rule, the expenditure was presumed non-deductible and can only be 
deducted by the taxpayer if first of all, he proved that it relates to genuine 
and proper transactions.
Furthermore, the more advantageous tax regime under the special rule was 
not defined in the Belgian law, and the special rule was applied by the tax 
authorities and national courts on a case-by-case basis. This lack of precise 
delimitation of the scope of the rule created uncertainty as to whether the 
special rule would apply to a taxpayer.
Accordingly,  due  to  the  stricter  conditions  for  the  expenditure  to  be 
deductible than those of the general rule and the uncertainty created by the 
lack  of  a  precise  delimitation  of  its  scope,  the  special  rule  dissuaded 
taxpayers  from exercising their  right  to make use of  services offered by 
providers  established  in  other  Member  States,  as  well  as  those  foreign 
providers to offer their services to recipients in Belgium.  It follows that the 81
Belgian rule constituted a restriction on the freedom to provide and acquire 
services.
The Belgian Government argued that such restriction can be justified by the 
need  to  combat  tax  avoidance,  by  the  need  to  preserve  the  balanced 
allocation of tax power between Member States and by the need to ensure 
the effectiveness of fiscal supervision.
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The Court  accepted these three justifications  but  held that  the  rule  went 
beyond what is necessary. The rule required the Belgian taxpayer to provide 
proof of these services to be genuine and proper, without the tax authorities 
being  required  to  provide  even  prima  facie  evidence  of  tax  evasion  or 
avoidance.  The  rule  also  lacked  an  objective  criterion  to  test  for  the 82
existence of a wholly artificial arrangement. This lack of predefined scope 
created a degree of uncertainty. According to the Court, such a rule did not, 
therefore, meet the requirements of the principle of legal certainty, which 
requires rules of law to be clear, precise and predictable, in particular, if 
these effects are unfavourable for taxpayers. Hence, the ECJ concluded that 
the rule cannot be considered to be proportionate to the objectives pursued.
The  Belgian  provision  was,  therefore,  an  unjustifiable  restriction  of  the 
freedom to provide services.
Remark: the national rules go beyond what is necessary if it does not meet 
the requirements of legal certainty. Thus, national transfer pricing rules shall 
be clear, precise and predictable. 
Conclusion
The  Court  of  Justice  is  more  welcome  to  accept  the  justifications  on 
discriminatory transfer pricing rules provided that these rules are capable of 
preventing the profits shift by artificial arrangement and recapture the tax 
which  shall  be  normally  paid  in  a  Member  State.  However,  due  to  the 
“single country approach” taken by the Court, it does not take whether there 
will be any corresponding adjustment in the other Member States concerned 
into  consideration.  As  a  consequence,  taxpayers  are  still  exposed  to  the 
economic double taxation resulting from transfer pricing rules.
3.3.2.3 Exemption and credit method 
Same to the decisions of thin cap rules, the Court also held that in respect of 
dividend payment, if a Member State employs a system to avoid economic 
double taxation on domestic dividends, it must achieve the same result on 
dividends  from other  Member  States.  But  Member  States  can choose  to 
apply an exemption method to domestic dividends and a credit method to 
foreign dividends. However, there may have adverse consequence stemming 
from to the application of these two approaches. 
C-446/04 FII Group Litigation (I)  83
According to the UK rules at  issue,  a  resident  shareholder who receives 
dividends  from a  resident  company  is  exempt  from corporation  tax.  By 
contrast, a shareholder is subject to corporation tax on dividend income if 
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the dividend is  from a non-resident  company.  But  in  the latter  case,  the 
shareholder is entitled to a credit for the WHT paid in the source state. And 
when the resident shareholder holds, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of 
the voting rights in the company making the distribution, the shareholder is 
entitled to a credit for both WHT and corporation tax paid by the company 
making the distribution.  The UK national  courts  requested a  preliminary 
ruling on the compatibility of the national rules from the Court. 
First, as regards the difference in treatment between dividends received in 
the  context  of  a  10%  or  more  shareholding  from  domestic  or  foreign 
subsidiaries(freedom of establishment and free movement of capital),  the 
Court  held  that  no  matter  what  mechanism employed  for  preventing  or 
mitigating the imposition of a series of charges to tax or economic double 
taxation, the freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty preclude a 
Member State from treating foreign-sourced dividends less favorably than 
national-sourced dividends.  However, Member States are free to choose 84
the method for mitigating a series of charges to tax. The Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive leaves open the choice between an exemption and an imputation 
system. As long as the tax rate applied to foreign-sourced dividends is not 
higher than the rate applied to national-sourced dividends and that tax credit 
is at least equal to the amount paid in the Member State of the company 
making the distribution, up to the limit of the tax charged in the Member 
State of the company receiving the dividends.  There was no less favorable 85
treatment here. Thus, the UK rules were not restrictive in this respect.
Second,  as  regards  dividends  paid  in  the  context  of  a  shareholding  not 
exceeding 10%(the free movement of capital), the Court found that there 
was  a  different  treatment.  Under  the  UK  legislation,  national-sourced 
dividends  were  exempt  from  corporation  tax,  whilst  foreign-sourced 
dividends were subject to that tax and were entitled to relief only as regards 
the WHT charged in the source state.  In the context of a tax rule which 86
sought to prevent or mitigate taxation of profits distributed, foreign-sourced 
and national-sourced dividends are deemed to be comparable as they are 
both  exposed  to  a  series  of  charges  of  tax.  The  recipients  of  foreign-87
sourced dividends were in a less favorable situation as they only received 
credit for the foreign WHT but not for the series of charges of tax existing 
first,  at  the  distributing  company  level  and,  again,  in  the  hands  of  the 
shareholder.  The  ECJ  rejected  the  argument  that  it  would  be 
administratively  difficult  to  determine  the  tax  actually  paid  in  another 
Member  State.  It  also  rejected  the  claim  that  the  provision  of  the  UK 
legislation  was  still  more  generous  than  the  Parent-Subsidiary  Directive. 
The Court  held that  although indeed this  Directive did not  apply,  at  the 
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material time, to shareholdings under 25%, that did not entail that Member 
States  could  maintain  legislation  that  treated  foreign-sourced  dividends 
unfavourably under this threshold.88
Remark:  the  rule  that  applies  the  exemption  method  to  national-sourced 
dividends  and  credit  method  to  foreign-sourced  dividends  is  allowed  if 
(1)the tax rate applied to foreign-sourced dividends is not higher than the 
rate  applied  to  national-sourced  dividends,  (2)company  receiving  the 
dividends  shall  be  granted  a  tax  credit  for  the  tax  actually  paid  by  the 
company making the distribution in the State in which the latter is resident, 
and (3)the tax credit is at least equal to the amount paid in the Member State 
of the company making the distribution, up to the limit of the tax charged in 
the Member State of the company receiving the dividends.
C‐35/11 FII Group Litigation(II)  89
The objective of this case is  to obtain a clarification of the judgment of 
C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation.
In the first FII case, the CJEU has already ruled out that exemption method 
to  national-sourced  dividends  and  credit  method  to  foreign-sourced 
dividends is not contrary to freedom of movements, provided that the tax 
rate applied to foreign-sourced dividends is not higher than the rate applied 
to national-sourced dividends and that the tax credit is at least equal to the 
amount paid in the Member State of the company making the distribution, 
up to  the limit  of  the tax charged in the Member State  of  the company 
receiving the dividends.  90
In this case, the question arose because the effective level of taxation of the 
profits of companies resident in the United Kingdom was, in the majority of 
cases, lower than the nominal rate of tax applicable. For example, imaging 
the nominal corporation tax rates on resident companies in both the UK and 
other  Member  States  are  20%.  Nonetheless,  companies  distributing 
dividends  benefit  from  a  corporation  tax  reduction  and  therefore  the 
effective tax rate applied is 10% in these Member States. As a result, in the 
UK, the tax rate that national-sourced dividends subject is 10% due to the 
exemption method applied, while the tax rate that foreign-sourced dividends 
subject is still 20% because the imputation method does not enable the tax 
reductions  to  be  passed  on  to  the  shareholder.  Then  the  exemption  and 
imputation  methods  may cease  to  be  equivalent.  And in  the  UK,  in  the 
majority of case, the effective tax rate was lower than the nominal rate. The 
foreign-sourced dividends were in fact suffered a less favorable treatment 
than the national-sourced dividends, which constituted a restriction on the 
freedoms of establishment and capital movements. 
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The  Court  rejected  that  such  restriction  can  be  justified  by  the  need  to 
ensure the cohesion of tax system and held that national rules which took 
account in particular, also under the imputation method, of the nominal rate 
of  tax  to  which  the  profits  underlying  the  dividends  paid  have  been 
subjecting  would  be  appropriate  for  preventing  the  economic  double 
taxation of the distributed profits and for ensuring the cohesion of the tax 
system while being less prejudicial to the freedom of establishment and the 
free movement of capital.   91
Remark:  when  the  effective  level  of  taxation  of  company  profits  in  the 
Member State concerned is generally lower than the prescribed nominal rate 
of tax and when the Member State applies the exemption method to the 
internal dividend but credit method to the foreign dividend, the nominal rate 
of tax in the dividend distributing Member State shall be taken into account.
Conclusion: Following the case-law, the Court of Justice does not oblige 
Member States to eliminate economic double taxation as a general rule. It 
only precludes the discriminatory national rules which cannot be justified by 
overriding public reasons, especially the need to ensure the allocation of tax 
power  between  Member  States  and  the  prevention  of  tax  evasion.  To 
preclude less-favourable treatment on cross-border activity, where Member 
States  adopt  rules  to  eliminate  domestic  economic double  taxation,  such 
rules should treat the international economic double taxation in the same 
way. 
3.4 Problem raised by the ATAD 
3.4.1 Introduction  
The OECD has launched the Anti-Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project, 
aiming to combat cross-border tax avoidance arrangements as they seriously 
erode national corporate tax bases and affect the functioning of the internal 
market. In order to ensure the BEPS measures will be implemented in the 
EU in a coordinated manner, the Council adopted the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive on 12 July 2016. The ATAD contains five measures to against tax 
planning (the interest limitation rule, the exit taxation, the general anti-abuse 
rule, the controlled foreign company rule, and the hybrid mismatches). The 
ATAD applies to all taxpayers that are subject to corporate tax in one or 
more  Member  States,  including  PEs  in  one  or  more  Member  States  of 
entities  resident  for  tax  purposes  in  a  third  country.  It  sets  minimum 92
requirements that Member States need to apply and does not preclude the 
Member States to adopt a higher level protection for domestic corporate tax 
bases.
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3.4.2 Interest limitation rule 
The interest limitation, which is the article 4 of the ATAD, provides that 
exceeding borrowing costs are only deductible up to 30% of the taxpayer’s 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization(EBITDA). The 
“exceeding borrowing cost” means that the amount by which the deductible 
borrowing costs of a taxpayer exceed taxable interest revenues and other 
economically  equivalent  taxable  revenues  that  the  taxpayer  receives 
according to national law.   The Member State can introduce carve-out for 93
standalone  entities,  for  the  exceeding  borrowing  cost  not  exceeding  3 
million EUR, for companies belonging to a consolidated group, for financial 
undertakings and for public project funding. Although Member States may 
provide carry-forward or carry-back of exceeding borrowing costs and/or 
unused interest capacity, there is no obligation for Member State to do so. If 
the interest received state includes the non-deductible exceeding borrowing 
costs into taxable income, there will be economic double taxation. In recital 
5 of the ATAD, the requirement of eliminating double taxation has been 
shown:
  “Where the application of those rules gives rise to double taxation, taxpayers 
should receive relief through a deduction for the tax paid in another Member State 
or third country, as the case may be. Thus, the rules should not only aim to counter 
tax avoidance practices but also avoid creating other obstacles to the market, such 
as double taxation.”  94
However, there is no provision in the ATAD about how to resolve the double 
taxation arising from the interest limitation rule. 
3.4.3 Exit taxation 
The ATAD introduces an exit tax on transferred assets when assets or 
businesses are transferred between a head office and a PE or between PEs in 
different Member States. An exit tax may also arise when a taxpayer 
transfers its tax residence to another Member State. Taxpayers can defer the 
payment for five years in some circumstances.  The deferral may subject to 95
interest charging in accordance with the legislation of the relevant Member 
State and a guarantee may need to be provided for the deferral if there is a 
demonstrable and actual risk of non-recovery.  The recipient Member State 96
shall accept the value established by the exit Member State as the starting 
point of the assets provided that it reflects market value. Nonetheless, the 
ATAD provides no solution when the two Member States concerned have 
different rulings on the market value, or when the value set by the exit 
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Member State is higher than the market value. In that sense, once the 
recipient Member State rejects to regard the value set by the exit Member 
State as the starting value, double taxation may arise. 
3.4.4 GAAR 
The  GAAR  is  designed  to  take  over  the  prevention  of  tax-avoidance 
agreements where the special anti-avoidance rules do not work. The GAAR 
provides that “for the purposes of calculating the corporate tax liability, a 
Member  State  shall  ignore  an  arrangement  or  a  series  of  arrangements 
which, having been put into place for the main purpose or one of the main 
purposes of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of 
the applicable tax law, are not genuine having regard to all relevant facts 
and circumstances.”  The arrangements shall be regarded as non-genuine to 97
the extent that it is not put into place for valid commercial reasons which 
reflect  economic  reality.  And  the  legal  consequence  of  ignoring 98
arrangements  is  that  the  corporate  tax  liability  shall  be  calculated  in 
accordance with national law.99
There are some issues regarding the GAAR. Firstly, the terms established 
the GAAR are relatively new and broad. It leaves questions about how the 
Member States will  implement the GAAR into their  national  law.  For 100
example, “Which commercial reason is valid? What is economic reality? 
How to determine the purpose of the applicable tax law?”
Although it is stated in the proposal to the ATAD that the GAAR shall be in 
line with the ECJ’s “artificiality test” when being applied within the EU, 
there continues to be uncertainty as regards the actual position of the ECJ 
with respect to different concrete situations. 
Since there may have disparities when Member States interpret the GAAR 
into their national legal system and since there is no mechanism of mutual 
recognition or  corresponding adjustment,  the GAAR may lead to double 
taxation.101
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3.4.5 CFC rule 
The  CFC rules  have  the  effect  that  the  income  of  a  low-tax  controlled 
subsidiary would be reattributed to its parent company and then the income 
would subject to taxation in the state of the parent company.102
An entity or PE would be treated as a CFC where (a) the entity or PE is 
controlled  by a  parent  company established in  the  EU and (b)the  actual 
corporate tax it paid on its profit is lower than the difference between the tax 
that the entity or the PE would pay if it is established in the Member State of 
the parent company and the actual corporate tax paid.103
Once an entity or PE is treated as a CFC, its profit would be included in the 
tax base of its parent company. The ATAD provides two approaches that 
Member  States  may  opt  for  determining  the  CFC  income.  Category 
approach provides a list of income that would be attributed to the tax base of 
the  parent  company,  for  example,  royalty,  interest  and  dividend.  To 104
comply  with  the  fundamental  freedoms,  the  category  approach  shall  not 
apply “where the CFC carries on a substantive economic activity supported 
by staff, equipment, assets and premises, as evidenced by relevant facts and 
circumstances.”  Substance approach provides that the Member State of 105
the parent company shall include the non-distributed income of the entity or 
PE into tax base when the income arises from “non-genuine arrangements 
which have been put in place for the essential purpose of obtaining a tax 
advantage.”  Arrangements shall be regarded as non-genuine to the extent 106
that  the  entity  or  PE  would  not  “own  the  assets  or  would  not  have 
undertaken the risks which generate all, or part of, its income if it was not 
controlled by a company where the significant people functions, which are 
relevant to those assets and risks, are carried out and are instrumental in 
generating the controlled company's income”.107
The BEPS report on action 3 listed some situations that double taxation may 
arise: (i)situations where the CFC income is subject to taxation in the CFC 
jurisdiction as well as to CFC taxation in the parent company’s jurisdiction; 
(ii) situations where the CFC income is taxed under the CFC rules operating 
in more than one jurisdiction; (iii) situations where a CFC actually makes 
dividend distributions out of income that has already been attributed to its 
shareholders under the CFC rules or where a shareholder disposes of its 
CFC shares that have previously been included in the tax base pursuant to 
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CFC rule.  Even more complex, double taxation could arise where there is 108
a transfer pricing adjustment between two jurisdictions while a CFC charge 
arises in a third jurisdiction.  109
The ATAD provides measures to eliminate double taxation in the situations 
(i) and (iii). According to Article 8 of the ATAD, the resolution to the double 
taxation in situation (i) is that the Member State of the parent company shall 
allow a deduction of the tax paid by the entity or PE in the state in which it 
resides from the parent company’s tax liability.110
The resolution to the situation (iii) is that where the entity distributes profits 
to the taxpayer, the amounts of income previously included in the tax base 
shall be deducted from the tax base and where the taxpayer disposes of its 
participation in  the  entity  or  PE,  and any part  of  the  proceeds from the 
disposal previously has been included in the tax base pursuant to the CFC 
rules, that amount shall be deducted from the tax base when calculating the 
amount of tax due on those proceeds.111
Since all  Member States are expected to implement CFC rules into their 
legislation,  the  risk  of  the  same  income  subject  to  simultaneous  CFC 
taxation in two or multiple jurisdictions will most likely increase.  Thus, 112
there  would  be  a  risk  of  double  taxation  if  Member  States  ignore  the 
possibility of multiple CFC taxation when they implement the CFC rules.113
3.4.6 Hybrid mismatches 
Hybrid  mismatches  result  from the  differences  in  the  characterization of 
payments on financial instruments or of entities under the tax systems of 
two jurisdictions.  Hybrid mismatches can lead to the problem of  both 114
double taxation and double non-taxation. For example, a company in State 
A receives money from other company in State B. The payment is classified 
as  interest  in  State  A while  it  is  treated  as  dividend  in  State  B.  The 
inconsistent classification may lead to the non-deduction of the payment in 
the State B, while the payment may still be classified as interest payment in 
State A and thus included in the taxable of income. This leads to double 
taxation by way of non-deduction combined with inclusion at the level of 
the recipient.
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Double  non-taxation  occurs  when  the  payment  is  classified  as  interest 
payment in State B, while as dividend payment in State A. The payment 
may be deductible from the taxable income in State B and not included in 
the taxable income in State A. 
The  ATAD  only  provides  approaches  to  combat  double  non-taxation. 
Pursuant to the Article 9 of the ATAD, where a hybrid mismatch leads to 
double deduction, the deduction shall be given only in the Member State 
where  such  payment  has  its  source.  For  a  hybrid  mismatch  results  in  a 
deduction without inclusion, the Member State of the payer shall deny the 
deduction of such payment.  However, the ATAD does not provide any 115
solution to avoid double taxation in respect of hybrid mismatches.  Thus, 
there is a risk of double taxation to taxpayers.
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4. Existing mechanism to 
resolve double taxation 
disputes 
4.1 National legal remedies 
A taxpayer  may  challenge  the  imposition  of  tax  under  national  legal 
remedies. However, the national legal remedies are generally not effective 
when dealing with double taxation because the domestic courts do not have 
the power to rule on the tax imposed in another jurisdiction.  Therefore, 116
other mechanisms have been developed to resolve this issue. 
4.2 Mutual agreement procedure in the tax 
treaties 
Most double tax agreements include a provision equal or similar to Article 
25 of the OECD MTC for a mutual agreement procedure:
“Where  a  person  considers  that  the  actions  of  one  or  both  of  the 
Contracting States result or will result for him in taxation not in accordance 
with the provisions of this Convention, he may, irrespective of the remedies 
provided  by  the  domestic  law  of  those  States,  present  his  case  to  the 
competent authority of the Contracting State of which he is a resident… The 
competent  authority shall  endeavour,  if  the objection appears to it  to be 
justified and if  it  is not itself  able to arrive at a satisfactory solution, to 
resolve the case by mutual agreement with the competent authority of the 
other Contracting State, with a view to the avoidance of taxation which is 
not in accordance with the Convention.”117
However,  the  result  of  the  Article  25 is  not  efficient  due to  the  lack of 
specified time limit and the time-intense nature of the process.  Also, it 118
does  not  include  enforceable  requirements  for  Contracting  States  to 
eliminate double taxation, as the MAP only obliges competent authorities to 
negotiate, but not requires to reach a solution.  Moreover, as the OCED 119
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MTC  is  designed  to  target  the  problems  incurred  by  juridical  double 
taxation, the economic double taxation may prevent from entering into the 
MAP.
4.3 The EU Arbitration Convention 
The EU Member  States  have concluded a  multilateral  convention which 
aims to eliminate double taxation in the case of international transfer pricing 
adjustments of associated enterprises. The Arbitration Convention requires 
that agreement shall be achieved by Member States to have double taxation 
eliminated.  It  provides  that  if  the  competent  authorities  cannot  reach  an 
agreement in the MAP, then the case shall be referred to a so-called advisory 
commission. Concerning the legal status, the Arbitration Convention is not 
part  of  EU law  as  it  is  a  multilateral  convention  concluded  among  the 
Member  States.  Thus,  the  EU  Courts  have  no  power  to  interpret  the 
Arbitration Convention.
The Convention covers both double taxation of two group companies of two 
different EU Member States and double taxation of the headquarters and a 
branch in a different Member State.  Thus, it applies to both international 120
juridical and international economic double taxation.
4.3.1 The function of the Arbitration Convention 
(1) Mutual agreement procedure
Where an enterprise considers that the arm’s length principle has not been 
observed,  it  may  irrespective  of  the  national  remedies  provided  by  the 
Contracting State concerned, present its case to the competent authority of 
the Contracting State.  The enterprise shall  at  the same time notify the 121
competent  authority  if  there  are  other  Contracting  States  that  may  be 
involved in the case.  The competent authority shall then without delay 122
notify the competent authorities of those other Contracting States. 
If the competent authority considers the complaint is well-founded and a 
satisfactory  solution  is  not  able  to  be  achieved  by  itself,  the  competent 
authority shall endeavour to resolve the case by mutual agreement with any 
other  competent  authority  concerned,  with  a  view to  having  the  double 
taxation eliminated on the base of arm’s length principle.  The competent 123
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authorities should endeavour to reach an agreement within 2 years of the 
date  on  which  the  case  was  first  submitted  to  one  of  the  competent 
authorities.  However,  there is  no obligation under the MAP for  Member 
States  to  reach  an  agreement  to  eliminate  double  taxation.  Once  the 124
Contracting  States  reached  an  agreement,  the  agreement  should  be 
implemented  irrespective  of  any  time  limits  prescribed  by  the  domestic 
legislation of the Contracting States concerned.  125
(2) Arbitration procedure
Article 7 provides that if the competent authorities concerned fail to reach 
an agreement within two years, they shall set up an advisory commission 
charged with delivering its opinion on the elimination of the double taxation 
in question.  However,  once the case has been submitted to a court  or 126
tribunal, the term of two years referred to shall be computed from the date 
on which the judgment of the final court of appeal was given.  Where a 127
Member State’s domestic law does not permit its competent authorities to 
derogate from the decisions of its judicial bodies, the advisory commission 
will not be set up unless the associated enterprise of that State has allowed 
the time provided for appeal to expire, or has withdrawn its appeal before a 
decision has been delivered.128
The advisory commission shall deliver its opinion not more than 6 months 
from the date on which the matter was referred to it and the opinion of the 
advisory commission must be based on the arm’s length principle.  The 129
competent authorities party to the procedure must take a decision which will 
eliminate the double taxation within 6 months from the date on which the 
advisory  commission  delivered  its  opinion.  The  competent  authorities 130
must take the decision acting by common consent and the decision must be 
based on the arm’s length principle.  The decision may be in line with the 131
opinion of the advisory commission or it may deviate from it provided that 
it  is  based  on  the  arm’s  length  principle  and  it  eliminates  the  double 
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taxation.  If the competent authorities cannot reach an agreement, they are 132
obliged to act in accordance with the opinion of the advisory commission.133
4.3.2 The shortcomings of the Arbitration 
Convention 
The Arbitration Convention has been criticized a lot for its insufficiencies. 
In the following, the shortcomings of the Arbitration Convention will  be 
given.
(1) Limitation of scope
The  Arbitration  Convention  only  applies  to  double  taxation  caused  by 
international transfer pricing adjustments. Therefore, it cannot be used as a 
basis for other fields of double taxation.
(2)Lack of supervisor mechanisms
There  is  no  supervisor  organ  under  the  Convention  that  registers  and 
monitors case regarding their progress and whether or not the Convention’s 
deadlines are being complied with by competent authorities, and which can 
take action if competent authorities fail to fulfill their obligation under the 
Convention.  Although national courts are generally competent to enforce 134
compliance  with  obligations  arising  under  the  Convention  if  competent 
authorities fail to fulfill them, it has been acknowledged as not an efficient 
option,  as it  always delays the process of eliminating double taxation.  135
Thus, without a supervisory organ, there is no guarantee that double taxation 
will be eliminated in the given timeframe.
(3) Missing timeline
The Convention provides a timeline for the MAP (two years), the arbitration 
procedure (six months) and the final decision from competent authority (six 
months). However, it does not define a timeline for the process before the 
mutual agreement procedure. Therefore, there is no limit for the competent 
authority to make a decision on whether the case is well-found and whether 
the competent authority is not able to arrive at a satisfactory solution by 
itself.  This leaves Member States quite some leeway in conducting this 136
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procedure.  Moreover, the starting point of the MAP differs significantly. 137
According to the Commission researches, some of the Member States hold 
that  the two-year period does not start  until  the other Member State has 
formally notified that it does not accept the adjustment, while some other 
Member States express it starts when the tax authority receives a request 
from the taxpayer or when all necessary information has been provided.  138
As a consequence, it is uncertain for the taxpayers as to if and when their 
cases will be resolved.
(4) The absence of definition of terms
Many terms are  not  defined in  the  Convention,  such as  “enterprises”  in 
Article 1(1), “well-founded” and “satisfactory solution” in Article 6(2),  and 
“serious  penalty”  in  Article  8,  which  all  give  pressing  influence  in  the 
application  of  the  Arbitration  Convention.  Although according to  Article 
3(2), “[a]ny term not defined in this Convention shall, unless the context 
otherwise requires, have the meaning which it has under the double taxation 
convention between the States concerned,” this provision does not resolve 
many interpretation problems. It does not provide a solution when there is 
no double taxation convention between Member States or when more than 
two  States  are  concerned.  Moreover,  some of  the  conventions  do  not 139
contain  many  definitions,  but  referring  to  national  legislation  for 
interpretation.  Thus, there may be different applications according to the 140
Member States concerned. Unlike the instruments of the EU, the CJEU does 
not have right to interpret the terms of the Convention. Therefore, there is 
no solution to the different application of the Arbitration Convention. As a 
result, Member States can find easy excuses to refuse the application.  
(5) Unsatisfactory interaction with available domestic remedies
According  to  Article  6(1),  “[w]here  an  enterprise  considers  that…the 
principles set out in Article 4 have not been observed, it may, irrespective of 
the  remedies  provided  by  the  domestic  law  of  the  Contracting  States 
concerned,  present  its  case  to  the  competent  authority…”,  this  article 
implies that the Convention’s procedures and national legal remedies run 
simultaneously. Such simultaneous application aims to ensure that nothing 
blocks  the  taxpayers’  access  to  the  elimination  of  double  taxation.  141
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Therefore, once the competent authority rejects the taxpayer access to the 
procedures of the Convention, the taxpayer may lodge a domestic appeal for 
the elimination of double taxation unilaterally. Similarly, when the national 
courts agree on the adjustment of profit imposed, the taxpayer still has the 
possibility  to  have  the  double  taxation  eliminated  by  the  Arbitration 
Convention. 
Nonetheless, in practice, such parallel functioning has effectively blocked 
by Article 7(1) and 7(3) of the Convention. Article 7(1) provides that where 
the enterprises have recourse to the remedies available to them under the 
domestic  law  and  where  the  case  has  so  been  submitted  to  a  court  or 
tribunal, the two-year period of the MAP starts from the date on which the 
judgment of the final court of appeal was given. Therefore, the competent 
authorities will not likely commence their proceedings under the MAP while 
domestic procedures are pending.  Moreover, in accordance with Article 142
7(3), where a national law of a Member State does not permit the competent 
authorities  of  the  State  to  derogate  from  the  decisions  of  their  judicial 
bodies,  the  arbitration  procedure  shall  not  apply  if  a  decision  has  been 
delivered by the national courts. As a consequence, taxpayers are no longer 
granted a right to have double taxation eliminated under the Convention in 
the event a judicial body has already given a decision in the case, even if 
this decision does not resolve the double taxation.143
 (n.141), p.517142
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5.Proposed Directive on Double 
Taxation Dispute Resolution 
After recognized the shortcomings of the existing double taxation resolution 
mechanism, the European Commission proposed a directive to improve the 
present mechanism, which is expected to be transposed into national law of 
Member States by 31 December 2017. Once it has been entered into force, 
all national branches are bound by it. 
5.1 The scope of the Proposed Directive 
The Proposed Directive applies to all taxpayers that are subject to one of the 
taxes on income from business listed in Annex I of the Proposed Directive, 
including PEs situated in one or more Member States whose head office is 
either in a Member State or a jurisdiction outside the Union.  Annex I 144
provides  that  the  taxes  referred  include  income tax  and corporation  tax, 
which implies that both physical and legal persons are covered. 
The  Proposed  Directive  applies  to  disputes  between  Member  States. 
Consequently,  while  the  PEs  of  taxpayers  which  are  located  outside  the 
European Union may be involved in the dispute resolution process, taxation 
by  foreign  jurisdiction  in  itself  would  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  the 
directive.145
The Proposed Directive “does not apply to any income or capital within the 
scope of a tax exemption or which a zero tax rate applies under national 
rules.”146
5.2 The function of the Proposed Directive 
The Proposed Directive provides a three-step dispute resolution mechanism: 
(1) The complaint stage  
Article 3(1) of the Proposed Directive provides that “any taxpayer subject to 
double taxation shall be entitled to submit a complaint requesting the 
resolution of the double taxation to each of the competent authorities of the 
Member States concerned within three years from the receipt of the first 
notification of the action resulting in double taxation, whether or not it uses 
the remedies available in the national law of any of the Member States 
concerned.”  The competent authorities shall provide the confirmation of 147
its receipt within one month to both taxpayers and the other competent 
 The Proposed Directive, article 1144
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authorities involved.  The competent authorities shall decide on the 148
acceptance and admissibility of the complaint within six months of the 
receipt thereof. The decision can either be positive (accept the complaint) or 
negative (reject the complaint). A negative decision must be capable of 
being appealed in the domestic courts. 
If all the Member States involved adopt positive decisions, then the MAP is 
initiated. If one of the Member State involved issues a negative decision, an 
Advisory Commission shall be set up by the competent authorities 
concerned. The Advisory Commission is liable to deliver a decision on the 
admissibility and acceptance of the complaint within six months from the 
date of notification of the last decision rejecting the complaint.  If the 149
Advisory Commission confirms the existence of double taxation, the 
competent authorities concerned can request to start the MAP. Otherwise, 
the Advisory Commission shall give a decision on the elimination of double 
taxation.  If all the Member States involved decide to reject the complaint, 150
then the procedure under the Proposed Directive ends. 
(2) Mutual agreement procedure 
Under the MAP, the Member States concerned shall endeavor to resolve the 
double taxation within 2 years, starting from the last notification of the 
decision of one of the Member States to accept the complaint.  The MAP 151
would end up in two situations. First, if the Member States concerned end 
up in an agreement on the elimination of double taxation, the competent 
authorities must transmit the agreement to the taxpayer as a decision. The 
decision is binding on the competent authorities and enforceable by the 
taxpayer and must be implemented under national law. The domestic legal 
remedies shall be available to the taxpayer. Second, if the Member States 
concerned fail to reach an agreement, the arbitration procedure would start, 
except the double taxation is in cases of tax fraud, willful default, and gross 
negligence.  
(3)Arbitration Procedure 
The Advisory Commission shall be set up in the case where a complaint has 
been rejected by one Member State regarding the acceptance and/or the 
admissibility of the complaint, which has been reversed by the Advisory 
Commission, but subsequently to which none of the competent authorities 
have requested the MAP. It shall also be set up in the case when no 
agreements has been reached in the MAP stage. The Advisory Commission 
must be established no later than 50 calendar days after the end of the two-
year time limit for the MAP. Moreover, the competent authorities of the 
Member States concerned may agree to set up an Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Commission (“ADRC”) instead of the Advisory Commission. 
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The ADRC may differ regarding its composition and form from the 
Advisory Commission and apply conciliation, mediation, expertise, 
adjudication or any other dispute resolution process or techniques to solve 
the dispute.  The ADRC or the Advisory Commission shall deliver its 152
opinion no later than 6 months after the date it was set up to competent 
authorities of the Member States concerned.  After the ADRC or the 153
Advisory Commission has delivered its opinion, the competent authorities 
shall agree on the opinion of the Advisory Commission or the ADRC within 
6 months.  The competent authority may take a decision, which deviates 154
from the opinion of the Advisory Commission or the ADRC, but they are 
bound by that opinion if they fail to reach an agreement to eliminate the 
double taxation.  Member States shall provide that the final decision 155
eliminating double taxation is transmitted by each competent authority to 
the taxpayers within 30 calendar days of its adoption.  That final decision 156
is, subject to the taxpayer renouncing the right to any domestic remedy, 
binding on the competent authorities and enforceable by the taxpayer, and 
must be implemented into national law irrespective of any time limits. 
Taxpayers must also be able to refer to national courts in the case of a 
failure to implement the decision.  
(4) The elimination of double taxation 
In the Proposed Directive, the double taxation can be regarded as eliminated 
when only one Member State includes the income subject to double taxation 
in the computation of the taxable income, or when the tax chargeable on this 
income in one Member State is reduced by an amount equal to the tax 
chargeable on it in any other Member State.  157
5.3 Analysis 
(1)The scope 
The Proposed Directive, at first sight, has a very broad scope. In comparison 
to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest-Royalty Directive, the 
application of the Proposed Directive does not limit to associated companies 
having more than 10% or 25% shareholdings. Instead, it applies to both 
independent parties and dependent parties without any shareholdings 
requirements. Also, unlike the Arbitration Convention, which only resolves 
double taxation in respect of transfer pricing adjustments, the Proposed 
Directive broadens the scope, aiming to eliminate double taxation on 
business income in all cases. 
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It has been argued whether the Proposed Directive covers economic double 
taxation. This question is raised due to the wordings of Article 3(1), “any 
taxpayer subject to double taxation shall…”. Accordingly, the entitlement to 
submit a complaint in requesting the resolution appears to be limited to only 
same taxpayers subject to tax twice (juridical double taxation).  However, 158
this argument cannot be upheld. Under the Explanatory Memorandum, the 
Proposed Directive builds on the existing Arbitration Convention but 
broadens its scope to areas which have not been covered.  Since the 159
Arbitration Convention applies to both juridical and economic double 
taxation, the scope of the Proposed Directive shall not be limited to juridical 
double taxation. Moreover, concerning the objectives of the Proposed 
Directive, it intends to provide an effective solution for all cases of double 
taxation on business income.  Therefore, the economic double taxation 160
shall not be excluded from the application of the Proposed Directive.  
It is expected that the unresolved double taxation concerning interest 
payment, dividend payment, transfer pricing adjustment shall all come into 
the scope of the Proposed Directive. 
As discussed above, there is a risk of potential double taxation raised by the 
ATAD. The Arbitration Convention precludes the application of its 
procedures when the enterprise is liable to a serious penalty. By contrast, the 
Proposed Directive has a significant improvement by allowing a concurrent 
application.  Under Article 1,“this Directive shall not preclude the 161
application of national legislation or provision of international agreements 
where it is necessary to prevent tax evasion, tax fraud or abuse.” This 
provision points out that the Proposed Directive also applies to a dispute 
involving an anti-abuse provision.  
Concerning the multiple taxation, the definition of the double taxation 
provides that,“double taxation means the imposition of taxes… by two (or) 
more jurisdictions…” , which indicates that the application of the 162
Proposed Directive shall also cover the multiple situations.  
  
(2)The deadline
To improve the effectiveness, the Proposed Directive introduces a strict and 
enforceable  timeline.  The  Arbitration  Convention  was  criticized  for  the 
missing  deadline  before  the  mutual  agreement  procedure.  The  Proposed 
Directive  improves  this  by  obliging  the  competent  authorities  of  the 
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Member  States  to  decide  on  the  admissibility  and  acceptance  of  the 
complaint of a taxpayer within 6 months of the recipe thereof. And if the 
complaint is only rejected by one of the competent authorities, the Advisory 
Commission  shall  be  set  up,  which  shall  adopt  a  decision  on  the 
admissibility and acceptance of the complaint within 6 months from the date 
of notification of the last decision rejecting the complaint.  Moreover, the 
competent  authorities  shall  acknowledge receipt  of  the  complaint  with  1 
month  and may request  the information from the taxpayer  within two 163
months  from  the  receipt  of  the  complaint.  Therefore,  there  will  be 164
identified deadline for the complaint procedure. 
The Proposed Directive also provides strict and enforceable timelines for 
the MAP (2 years, but can be extended by up to 6 months subject to the 
acceptance by taxpayers and the competent authorities), the setting up of 
Advisory Commission (50 days),  the opinion from Advisory Commission(6 
months) and the final decision by the competent authorities(6 months).
(3)The interpretation of terms
There are some terms that have not been defined in the Proposed Directive. 
For example, “this Directive applies to all taxpayers that are subject to one 
of  the  taxes  on  income  from  business” ,  neither  the  income  nor  the 165
business has been defined. This may leave questions:  what is  “income”? 
What can be regarded as “business”?  Thereby it gives uncertainty to the 166
taxpayers  concerning  whether  they  can  claim  the  protection  under  the 
Proposed Directive.
As  opposed  to  the  Arbitration  Convention,  the  terms  of  which  are 
interpreted by the bilateral agreements or national legislation, the Court of 
Justice  is  supposed  to  give  a  standard  interpretation  of  the  Proposed 
Directive.  The  shortcomings  of  inapplicable  of  the  Arbitration 167
Convention  resulting  from  different  interpretation  of  its  terms  may  be 
addressed  by  the  uniform interpretation  from the  Court  in  the  Proposed 
Directive. Although undefined terms can be resolved by referral process to 
the CJEU, it will last for a long time and will not be resolved in the short 
future.  In that  sense,  this  would be better  to be improved in the official 
directive. 
(4)The supervisory mechanism
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Firstly, it is the task of the Commission to make sure that the Member States 
implement the Proposed Directive correctly. The Commission is required to 
initiate an infringement procedure before the Court of Justice if it considers 
that a Member State has enacted or kept in force domestic provisions, which 
are  incompatible  with  the  EU law,  or  that  it  has  failed  to  implement  a 
directive in a timely or accurate fashion.  Concerning monitoring cases in 168
terms of their progress and whether or not the Convention’s deadlines are 
being  complied  with  by  competent  authorities,  it  is  still  the  task  of  the 
national court to do so in the Proposed Directive. As analyzed above, the 
national court has been criticized in the Arbitration Convention as not an 
efficient  option.  The  problem  still  has  not  be  resolved  in  the  Proposed 
Directive. However it may be resolved by ways, which have been suggested 
by  Pit  in  his  article ,“a  central  and  permanent  secretariat  could  be 169
established, functioning under the auspices of the European Commission, 
which  would  assist  advisory  commissions  in  conducting  the  arbitration 
procedure and also monitor compliance with the Convention deadlines.” 
(5)Interaction with national proceedings
The provisions concerning the interaction with national proceedings in the 
Proposed Directive do not make any difference comparing to the Arbitration 
Convention. Article 15(3) of the Proposed Directive is similar to the Article 
7(1) of the Arbitration Convention, which provides that,“where the case has 
been submitted to a court or tribunal, the following dates shall be added to 
the date on which the judgment of the final court was given: (a) six months 
referred to in Article 3(5) concerning taking a decision on the acceptance 
and admissibility of the complaint; (b) two years referred to in Article 4(1) 
about  the  MAP.”  This  provision  prevents  the  Proposed  Directive’s 
procedures  and  national  legal  remedies  to  run  simultaneously  and  may 
extend the time for having double taxation elimination to an unforeseeable 
length.
The Proposed Directive also provides derogation from the Directive. Where 
the  domestic  law  of  a  Member  State  does  not  permit  that  a  dispute 
resolution decision derogates from the decisions of their judicial bodies, the 
arbitration  procedure  and  the  procedure  regarding  determining  of 
admissibility and acceptance of the complaint by the Advisory Commission 
shall  not  be  available  to  the  taxpayer  once  the  judicial  proceedings 
concerning  the  double  taxation  have  been  initiated,  unless  the  taxpayer 
withdrawn its action before the final decision is delivered.  Therefore, the 170
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taxpayers may not be able to have the double taxation eliminated, once the 
judicial body in a Member State has already given a decision, even if the 
decision does not resolve the double taxation.
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Conclusion:  
Juridical and economic double taxation constitute an obstacle to the 
functioning of the single market. The European Union has adopted the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest-Royalty Directive to allocate 
the power to tax between Member States in respect of dividend, interest, and 
royalty. Due to the limited scope, the two directives fail to remove the 
double taxation issues in these three respects and are even far from 
resolving other issues. The Court of Justice of the European Union regards 
itself as unable to provide any help for juridical double taxation. Because 
juridical double taxation as the parallel exercise of Member States’ fiscal 
sovereignty, in the absence of uniform measures at the EU level, the Court 
has no competent to allocate Member States’ power to tax. By contrast, the 
Court gives preliminary rulings on the economic double taxation issues. 
Following the case-law, the Court precludes economic double taxation 
resulting from discriminatory national rules which cannot be justified by 
overriding reasons. And once a Member State has a system to prevent 
economic double taxation, it should treat the internal situations and the 
cross-border situations in the same way. Consequently, taxpayers may still 
subject to economic double taxation in the case that national rules are not 
discriminatory. Therefore, the substantive law of the EU is capable of 
resolving double taxation only in a limited scope. Moreover, the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive may expose the taxpayers to more potential double 
taxation issues. 
The Arbitration Convention, which is a multilateral convention concluded 
between Member States, provides a set of procedural rules for Member 
States to have double taxation eliminated in the field of international 
transfer pricing adjustments. It has been recognized that the Arbitration 
Convention fails to achieve the objectives that were supposed to obtain. It 
has been criticized for having many shortcomings, for example, missing 
timeline and uninterpreted terms, which prevent the taxpayers to benefit 
from the Arbitration Convention. For improving the existing measures, the 
European Commission has proposed a directive which aims to resolve 
double taxation on business income in all cases. The Proposed Directive is 
designed to provide a broader scope and a more enforceable mechanism to 
conquer the shortcomings of the existing approaches. Although the 
Proposed Directive is capable of providing more protection to taxpayers, 
there are still some potential risks that may block the taxpayer to access to 
the Proposed Directive. The undefined terms of the Proposed Directive may 
lead to 28 versions of interpretation in the EU. Moreover, the lack of 
supervisory organ and the incomplete interaction with Member State’s 
national legislation may bring the time of procedure into an unforeseeable 
length. Therefore, although the Proposed Directive is a big step in the 
improvement of double taxation issue resolution mechanism, it may still be 
unable to resolve all remaining double taxation issues on business income. 
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